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Article 7

Book Reviews

A Culture of Teaching: Early Modern Humanism in Theory and Practice by Rebecca W. Bushnell. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 210,
$37.50 cloth; $15.95 paper.
Rebecca Bushnell's new book is a self-professedly humanist study of Renaissance humanist pedagogy. The book begins with a short introduction,
entitled "The Trials of Humanism," which surveys some of the political debates in which academic humanism has recently become embroiled. This
survey, while dispassionate, and while denying any "essential resemblance"
(7) between critiques from the right and the left, nevertheless portrays pre-

sent-day humanism as a flexible and moderate way of thinking caught between rigid ideological extremes. Moreover, Buslmell maintains, the anti-

humanism of much academic and postmodern theory in the 1980s has distorted recent scholarship on early modern humanism. In particular, she
objects to Foucauldian readings which supposedly portray Renaissance humanist pedagogy as a "uniformly repressive ... regime" (18). In A Culture of
Teaching, Bushnell emphasizes rather what she variously calls the ambivalences, paradoxes, or contradictions of early humanist texts, arguing that they

reflect the instabilities and uncertainties of power both in the early modern
classroom and in early modern culture more generally. Describing her approach, she writes: "I have tried to remain open to the multiple resonances
of these texts rather than merely tuning in those themes repeated in our own
time, and I have looked for what terms, tropes, and theories were generated
and exchanged in the past rather than laying a grid of modern theory over
those texts" (9). Here Bushnell sounds rather like the Renaissance humanists
themselves in their insistent return ad fontes and in polemically rejecting the
"barbarous" abstractions of scholastic philosophy. The resuits, in this book,
are mixed.

'

To be sure, much good comes of her approach. Bushnell's patient reading
and thorough scholarship produce a detailed, nuanced portrait of (as her
subtitle has it), the "theory and practice" of early modern humanism in England. Chapter Two, "The Sovereign Master and the Scholar Prince," exemplifies Bushnell's approach by stressing the paradoxical structure of authority
in early Tudor schools. While humanist schoolteachers often exercised absolute (sometimes even tyrannical) authority in the classroom, they occupied a
relatively lowly pOSition in society at large, often below that of their pupils.
This paradox is heightened, as Bushnell shows, when the pupil happened to
be a prince of the realm. Bushnell also explores the contradictions inherent in
humanist attempts to produce free and autonomous citizens who nevertheless respect authority, and to make the schoolroom into a space which is in-

dependent of family and state, yet reproduces their ideologies.
Chapter Three, "Cultivating the Mind," is perhaps the most successful and
engaging in the whole book. By exploring the habitual recourse to horticultural metaphors in humanist pedagogical texts, Bushnell shows how "the
analogy between teaching and gardening represents the student as completely malleable yet with a natural resistance to manipulation" (21). Bushnell makes this analogy more complex and compelling by examining not
only teaching manuals but also the new literature on gardening and horticulture written for the middle and lower classes.
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Chapter Four, "Harvesting Books," extends Bushnell's analysis of cultural
authority to the curriculum of the humanist schools. Here the principal paradox involves a tension between pedagogical demands for coverage" and the
humanists' distinctive brand of close reading. Bushnell also shows how the
humanist tendency to disintegrate or atomize texts eventually came into conflict with a more neoclassical aesthetic which saw literary works as unified
wholes rather than collections of tropes or commonplaces.
Chapter Five, "Tradition and Sovereignty," has a slightly oblique relation
to the rest of the book, since here the focus begins to shift from pedagogy to
poetics. The humanist insistence on imitating classical literary forms, Bushnell argues, raises implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) political issues of
freedom and authority, creativity and tradition, nature and custom. These, in
turn, are taken up, reworked, and contested in the poetic treatises and practices of writers such as Philip Sidney and George Buchanan, the young King
James (who wrote a tract on Scottish poetry) and Samuel Daniel. In essence,
this chapter extends the book's earlier meditations on the politics of humanist pedagogy to the sphere of Renaissance poetic theory.
The virtue of A Culture of Teaching lies in its ability to fill in some blank
areas and to make some helpful adjustments to the existing picture of humanist pedagogy. But the results of Bushnell's study are not nearly distinctive enough to justify the polemical energy she whips up in its behalf. She
often seems driven to caricature or misrepresent the work of other scholars
and theorists (whose views she then ends up largely reproducing) in order to
exaggerate her own originality. In particular, her renditions of Foucault's
views are frequently simplistic and reductive.
Bushnell is surely right to argue that theory will impose a "grid" on early
modern humanism if it is applied without careful attention to the nuances of
the texts themselves. Yet adopting a sympathetic, "empirical" attitude towards humanist writings can entail its own dangers if-as is sometimes the
case in this book-it impedes a necessary skepticism towards those writings.
A Culture of Teaching too often confuses the humanists' own portrayals of
themselves with the objective effects of their theories and practices. Bushnell's approach ignores the fact that institutions often impose their own logics, which may not be identical with the views of any of the persons working
within such institutions. Nor does it consider the possibility that the humanists' own political vocabulary might not adequately grasp or represent the
manifold forms of power and domination at work in their society-forms
which might be more apparent to theorists and historians with the advantage of historical hindsight. The expressed views of the humanists themselves surely provide crucial evidence for any historical reconstruction of
early humanist pedagogy. But there is a fine line between sympathetic, attentive reading and credulous or apologetic reading, and Bushnell's book
sometimes edges toward, if not over, this line.
Despite such shortcomings, however, A Culture of Teaching is an informative and challenging addition to the critical literature on early modem humanism. It adds considerable depth and detail to our understanding of
Tudor pedagogy and poetics.
/I

University of Colorado, Boulder

Richard Halpern

Criticism, Vol. XXXIX, no. 4: Book Reviews

615

Shakespeare's Universal Wolf Studies in Early Modern Reification by Hugh
Grady. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 241. $65.00.
This study is simultaneously one of the most important marxist readings
of Shakespeare to date and a work that consciously shows the need to adapt
such readings to less politicized, more humanistic forms of ethical criticism.
With its main title this book refers, of course, to the well-known metaphor in
Troilus and Cressida: "And appetite, an universal wolf / (So doubly seconded
with will and power), / Must make perforce an universal prey, / And last
eat up himself." Ulysses'sermonic speech, and others like it in Othello, King
Lear, and As You Like It, prOVide part of the basis for Grady's claim that
"Shakespeare and his art registered, reflected on, and ... passionately denounced the historically new forms of reification erupting into a social world
in the earliest stages of the permanent cultural revolution we blandly call
modernity" (56).
Indeed, drawing on a deep acquaintance with twentieth-century social
criticism and theory, Shakespeare's Universal Wolf seeks to restore a measure
of personal agency to marxist literary criticism even as it extends backward
the approximate terminus a quo of the "modernity" relevant to criticism influenced by the Frankfurt school. To this end, Grady replaces the Enlightenment with the more cluttered but profoundly significant era of Bacon,
Montaigne, Donne, Marlowe, and Machiavelli. At the same time, his study
joins Lars Engle's Shakespearean Pragmatism (1993) and the reviewer's own
Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare (1992) in seeing the early modern era as strongly affected by the market-centered ethos that has gradually
assumed primacy in modern life.
We commonly understand reification to mean a process or state in which
an abstraction is treated or seen as if it really existed. Because marxism has
traditionally held it to be a product of newer economies, reification is often
linked with alienation and commodity fetishism under capitalism. All three
of these have at their base the notion of error: misrecognition, misplacement,
misevaluation. As it functions in this study, "reification" strongly connotes
this larger sense of error, though in an almost theological way: error resulting, that is, not from an individual's mistaken decision, but from a generalized mode of life. Building on Lukacs's understanding of reification as the
"tendency for abstracted, rationalized systems to enchain the social subjects
who had collectively created them in all areas of capitalist society ... not just
in its economic relations" (42, Grady's paraphrase), Grady uses the term to
cover a variety of practices and states in Shakespeare.
To Grady, reification involves both "an amoral, pleasure- and power-seeking 'will'" (44), and '''instrumental reason,'" a way of thinking "in which all
values are suspended in a totalizing quest for techniques, means, and instruments to transform reality according to any human desires or purposes
whatsoever" (52). In Shakespeare's plays, reification takes place in the vacuum of an imagined world (visualized melodramatically by Marlowe) that is
post-Christian, postfeudal, and desacralized. Hence reification is the postlapsarian condition of being divorced from a conununicative society and its
traditional, shared values. It is the condition of an individualism which only
seems free and unconstrained, but is actually, like Shakespeare's "universal
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wolf," a self-consuming artifact of modernity, caught up in what Horkheimer and Adorno refer to as a '''purposeless purposiveness'" (67). What Coleridge (in speaking of lago) calls "motiveless malignity," and (in speaking of
Thersites) a "portrait of intellectual power deserted by all grace, all moral
principle, all not momentary purpose," and what popular response labels
simply as "evi!," Grady calls reification.
The benefit of this reading is not that it gives the distant a familiar appearance, but that it uncovers, meaningfully and with a contemporary vocabulary, themes manifest in the early modern era itself-especially in relation to
a handful of primary characters. As is perhaps not surprising for anyone
whose political consciousness the Nixon era affected, Grady is fascinated by
cunning, bad men who manifest their hatred privately. His readings of the
instrumental rationality of such characters as Thersites, Iago, and Edmund
are coupled, however, with an equivalent focus on the better halves of the
tragedies' character pairings: along with the "foxes" previously named (the
metaphor is Wyndham Lewis's), Grady examines the painfully deluded
"lions" of Troilus, Othello, and Lear.
Yet it is not, finally, the tension betvveen the Trojans' narcissistic idealism
and the Greeks' Realpolitik that most interests Grady, nor that between lago's
instrumental reason and Othello's heroic subjectivity, or even between Edmund's radical scepticism and Lear's roots in a more traditionalistic cultural
order. What most concerns him in this study is the way both sides of these
pairings, and other characters in the plays, are shaped by, even in thrall to,
apparently unprecedented habits of thought and practice that exceed their
tmderstanding and control.
Replacing the moral categories of critical tradition-which had stressed the
differences among such characters-with an approach that emphasizes their
common lack of commonality, Grady shows why these savage dramas speak
so movingly to our condition. In his final reading he takes up As You Like It
as a kind of utopian inversion of the thematics evident in the tragedies examined, King Lear in particular (of which As You Like It seems a comedic
double). According to Grady, the two "worlds" of As You Like It are related
by utopian projection: "the play creates an imagined, counter-factual realm
of idealizations whose relation to the reified "real" of the play is that the
former imaginatively fills the lack constituted by the play of desire within
the real" (192). In itself an unobjectional point, the statement here asks us to
ask, first, whether what Grady is describing as a historical phenomenon may
have an equally strong generic determinant. Whether, that is, the "purposive
purposelessness" he analyzes in Shakespeare isn't-with a different vocabulary, but similar form-present to tragedy from the Greeks forward. Grady
would have strengthened his argument had he been able to prove the historical specificity of the phenomenon he explores, perhaps by contrasting literary texts of the same genre.
Similarly, it is worth asking here what we gain by replacing a moral vocabulary with a marxist one. This seems an especially pressing question considering this study'S belief that reification does not have a strictly economic
cause. What is the difference, one might ask, between saying rago is "evil"
and holding him the wielder of instrumental reason? Many answers come to
mind, foremost among them that a marxist account points to something that
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we openly live with-toward capitalism and its various manifestations in
our everyday life. The difference, then, between calling lago "evil" and
seeing him as a manipulator of instrumental reason-even as he is manipulated by a subjectless system of life-is that the latter account relates not
only the interpretation but the composition of Shakespeare's plays to a way
of living in the world that we might believe we can change.
Yet during the past decade it has become increasingly more difficult to believe this. The Inarket, rather than class struggle, now seems to be-even, to
have been-the motivating logic of history. As this realization sinks in, the
practical differences between, on the one hand, a moralistic or ethical mode
of reading and, on the other, marxist criticism seem to diminish in importance. Severed from purely economic determinism, Grady's study has few
implications that a person with any of a variety of religious or ethical convictions might not embrace. In an era during which political marxism can be
said to have lost its subject, what seems most critical is not the source but
the consequences of reification. Marxism is the most worldly theory of sin in
its Inodern incarnation, and, as such, still has much to teach us. As Shakespeare's Universal Wolf demonstrates, however, it can benefit in turn from the
very human concerns of an otherwise conservative critical tradition.
The importance of this book extends beyond its readings and theory.
Grady is arguably one of the most careful thinkers in Shakespeare studies
today, and this care translates to his writing. It is a noteworthy irony that
someone with so little concern for "professionalist" endeavor should be such
an example for the profession, for few scholars currently produce works that
are so cOlnpletely readable, and so clearly books: substantive and coherent
projects that concentrate on a well-defined question, and appear only after
the author has devoted significant thought to the topic and texts at hand. I
can think of few better models to recommend to those, beginning books of
their own.
University of Texas, San Antonio

Douglas Bruster

Revision and Romantic Authorship by Zachary Leader. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1996. Pp. ix + 354. $70.00.
This book has a threefold argument: (1) Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron,
Mary Shelley, Clare, and Keats had a personal identity with integrity over
time, and the evidence is the fact that they said so (especially Wordsworth);
(2) it is best to understand even collaborative work in terms of an individual
writer if that writer consented to it; and mainly (3) readers should appreciate,
editors should reproduce, and scholars should know what an individual writer
preferred they should admire, reproduce, and know, because the writer
(principally Wordsworth) said so. Readers of this journal will surely know
that, over in law schools and among the biological and social sciences, "consent" is not such a simple matter; aInong departments of language and literature, textuality and personal identity are a donkey and a cart whose
positionality has been shifting in the past few decades; but with occasional
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recourse to declarations of "aesthetic value," this book's insistence on authorial personhood and intent may be appealing to traditionally minded academics.
Revision and Romantic Authorship follows important books on the relationships between textual histories and literary criticism of Romantic-period
works: Jack Stillinger's Multiple Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius
(1991), for example, and then Romantic Revisions, edited by Robert Brinkley
and Keith Hanley (1992), and then Stillinger's Coleridge and Textual Instability
(1994). Important and controversial books include Jerome McGann's Critique
of Modern Textual Criticism (1983) and his The Textual Condition (1991). Revision and Romantic Authorship voices a conservative point of view, without the
rigorous work among archival materials or the theoretical sophistication that
characterizes these earlier books.
The Introduction asserts that "currently fashionable . .. indeterminism can
be seen as no less Romantic than primitivism" (3). From Stillinger'S Multiple
Authorship and the Myth of Solitary Genius (1991), Leader gleans the principle
that "the nominal author's contribution and authority are dominant but not
exclusive": "even when fiercely professing independencef the author typically draws on a range of personal and institutional collaboratorsf including
familYf friendsf publishersf reviewersf and readers fl (15)-thusf for Leaderf
consent restores authorial intent.
Chapter One, "Wordsworth, Revision, and Personal Identity," begins by
criticizing Stephen Gill's 1984 edition, William Wordsworth (Oxford Authors),
for preferring early versions of poems: "the question of aesthetic value/f
Leader complains, "goes unmentioned" in the blurb on the back cover of
Gill's edition. Further, Wordsworth wrote (in a letter to Alexander Dyce,
1830) that he would prefer editors to follow "strictly the last Copy of the text
of an Author" (20). Leader asserts that Wordsworth's revisions and re-orderings manifest "his sense of the self as single and unified" (39). Though deconstruction and historicism may have challenged the idea that Ifimaginative
or recollective power is "redemptive/f Leader finds "evidence for it-evidence that is was Wordsworth's view" (54). Wordsworth was evidently not a
political apostate because he "was consistently scomfur' of such charges
(60).
A chapter on Byron quotes T. G. Steffan (Don Juan was written "for the
most part without thoughtful revision"), Jerome J. McGann ("before he left
England in 1816 he always paid scrupulous attention to the printing of his
works"), and draws from Marilyn Butler the conclusion that "the occupation
[of author] was SOCially degrading" for members of Byron's class (84). In
Leader's words, "Early Byron, in [Peter] Manning's words, 'was unusually
sensitive to the reception of his poetry'" (92); and Don Juan, "in McGann's
words, 'is radically, aggressively episodic and meandering'" (95). This trait
is said to reveal consistently Byron's personal identity.
A Chapter on Coleridge begins by pointing out that Coleridge called "unity" the "ultimate end of human Thought and human Feeling" (121). In the
case of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Leader ascribes to Stillinger the view
that "the editorial choice of the latest texts may well be artistically justifiable" (124).
A chapter on Frankenstein opposes the feminist contentions of critics inN
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cluding Anne Mellor and Johanna Smith who have suggested that revisions
to the novel were to a large extent impositions on Mary Shelley, who worked
under gendered constraint. Instead, Leader argues that "Mary Shelley consciously, willingly welcomed Percy Shelley's contributions" (171). In a rare
example, in this book, of primary scholarship, Leader reports having examined manuscripts of Frankenstein at the Bodleian Library, but concludes nothing from that examination on the grounds that Johanna Smith, writing in her
student edition of the novel, suggests that the manuscript evidence is inconclusive (171). (Readers interested in the writing and revision of Frankenstein
should, of course, consult the new edition, with facsimiles and transcriptions, The "Frankenstein" Notebooks, by Charles Robinson [New York: Garland, 1997], which was not available when Leader wrote.)
In Chapter Five Leader faults Eric Robertson and David Powell, editors of
the Oxford English Texts edition, The Early Poems of John Clare (1989), for preferring manuscript versions of poems to the versions revised by Clare's publisher, John Taylor, and others; Leader doubts that "Clare would have
preferred manuscript versions of his early poems" (207). Despite Clare's
writing that "grammer in learning is like Tyranny in government," Leader
denies that Clare's unconventional grammar and spelling had radical political importance, and likewise that Taylor'S corrections had conservative
meanings (223): "Taylor's political and moral revisions or censorings, and
Clare's willingness to accept them" include other motives: "Taylor cared
about profit" (238, 236-37).
The book's last chapter, on Keats, points out the familiar fact that poems
in Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes and Other Poems were revised by John
Taylor, Richard Woodhouse, and others, and, more generally, the poems
were modified in consideration of their likely effect on the public. As Keats
critics commonly do, Leader points out that Keats's earlier poetry had been
criticized by reviewers, including "Z" in "On the Cockney School of Poetry"
in Blackwood's Magazine (Oct. 1817). (I will mention that readers interested in
these issues will be well informed by such previous studies as McGann's
"Keats and the Historical Method in Literary Criticism," Modern Language
Notes 94 [1979], and the essays by many hands in Keats and History, ed. Nicholas Roe, 1995.) Leader affirms what Stillinger had previously shown with
scholarly authority: Keats's 1820 volume represents a collaboration; Leader
observes that "Keats ... seems to have welcomed the ... alterations" (294).
A seven-page Appendix, "Personal Identity in Eighteenth-Century
Thought," summarizes positions ascribed to Locke and Hume, partly by
briefly quoting familiar passages from their works and partly by relying on
Christopher Fox's account of the subject in Locke and the Scriblerians (1988).
Though the book might be informative for those who have not had leisure
to acquaint themselves with scholarship on Romanticism or with work on
scholarly editing over the last decade or so, some problems in the quality of
thinking represented in this book's arguments deserve to be pointed out.
Even if one could know what were Wordsworth's views on the question of
his "personal identity"-a difficult condition because documents are imperfect indicators of belief-it would not follow that the view is a correct one.
Even if Wordsworth had a "sense of the self as single and unified" (39), that
fact is no evidence that his self was (in fact) single and unified. The fact that
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Wordsworth "was consistently scornful" of charges that he was a political
apostate does not establish (as Leader suggests it does) that he was not a political apostate. Similar errors in reasoning appear in (and even dominate)
the chapters on the other authors.
The fact that Coleridge wrote in a notebook that "unity" is the "ultimate
end of human 1110ught and human Feeling" (quoted on p. 121) does not in
any way imply that unity is the ultimate end of those sorts of endeavor. And
even if unity were the ultimate end of human thought, it would not follow
that anything in the world is (or ever was) unified-no matter who likes it or
does not.
As Leader points out, it was Clare's view, for a time, that he was Lord Byron; it does not follow that Clare was Lord Byron, and it does not follow that
scholars or editors are condemned to maintain that he was Lord Byron because he said that he was. Whether editors should reproduce altered texts of
poems because authors wanted them to do so, and whether literary scholarship has a sciential function at all, or whether preference and an obsolete concept of "the self" should detennine the aims and methods of literary studies
-these are extremely important questions.
Texas A&M University

Terence Allan Hoagwood

Wordsworth and Feeling: The Poetry of an Adult Child by G. Kim Blank. Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1995. Pp. 261. $39.50.

In Wordsworth and Feeling: The Poetry of an Adult Child, G. Kim Blank
argues that "What often motivated Wordsworth's best poetry and what his
poetry is all about is the desire to describe and admit to those particular feelings, especially negative feelings, such as fear, anxiety, loss, sorrow, grief,
and guilt, and by such description and admission to attempt to transform
those feelings and then leave them" (23). Thus Blank sees the poet's achievement both as a personal or intellectual investigation," and as a form of
"therapy ... necessitated by the need to understand himself in order, quite
simply, to feel better about himself": "The clarity, hope, bliss, happiness, and
ecstasy that we sometimes associate with his poetry and the scene of production is overbalanced by the confusion, fear, pain, helplessness, sorrow, and
depression in his life and poetry; and the joy in life is overshadowed by a
concern for death" (26). To understand Wordsworth's poetry, then, we cannot simply read it in isolation from the events of his life; instead, we must
view it as a ""poetry of reenactment" (27) of an emotional life severely scarred
by childhood trauma. It is from such trauma, and the desire to come to
terms with it, that the powerful intensity of his poetry springs.
In the first chapter, Blank argues his position by weaving together passages from The Prelude and biographical summaries of Wordsworth's early
life. His point is that "'certain aspects and episodes of Wordsworth's life and
... portrayals of that life-into-poetry ... need revaluation" (46). And those
episodes, for Blank, are primarily ones of "'confusion and loss"': the death of
his parents, his stressful relations with his guardians, the affair with Annette
U
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Vallon. Blank has no new information about these episodes, but by emphasizing the darker side of Wordsworth's childhood and early manhood, and
by interpreting them in light of Alice MHler's "extensive and powerful writings on childhood trauma, child rearing, and psychotherapy" (27), he tries to
show just how anguished Wordsworth's emotional hfe really was, and how
his poetry represents an extraordinary attempt to achieve emotional equilibrium, in spite of it all.
Later chapters treat The Ruined Cottage and Lyrical Ballads (1798) (with
"Tintern Abbey" receiving a chapter of its own), the Coslar winter of 17981799, the Wordsworths' move to Grasmere in 1799-1800, and, finally, the
"Intimations" ode. In the course of each chapter, Blank draws on biographical information about Wordsworth and the work of practicing psychologists
(besides Miller, these include John Bradshaw and Deepak Chopra) to demonstrate the ways in which Wordsworth used the writing of poetry to confront
and heal a psyche deeply wounded by extraordinary childhood trauma.
Blank concludes with the "Ode" because he believes that, in writing that
poem, Wordsworth worked out Inost of his emotional problems; thus the
later poetry lacks the kind of emotional intensity that Blank finds in the
verse composed in the so-called Great Decade (and by Blank's model, it becomes more of a Great Eight Years).
The book has strengths. Blank is absolutely right to call attention to the
darker side of Wordsworth's make-up, and focus us on the powerful and
distressing emotional content of the poetry. It is surely emotional force that
made the poems worth reading in the first place, and has allowed them to
survive in spite of the gyrations that generations of amb.itious critics have
put them through. And Blank is also right to focus on the therapeutic value
of the poetry (The Prelude, for instance, is about nothing, if it is not about
therapy), and refreshingly iconoclastic in his choice of psychologists to provide his interpretive models: the triumvirate of Miller, Choprak, and Bradshaw is undoubtedly less well-known to Romanticists than, say, Lacan, bu t
they have the virtue of not having been largely discredited by their own profession.
In spite of these strengths, however, Wordsworth nnd Feeling is ultimately
disappointing, and for a number of reasons. I will focus on two of these, setting aside my own distaste for any argument that dismisses the later Wordsworth (and here "late" means anything written after age thirty-five). First is
a problem of audience. Blank seems originally to have intended this book for
an audience of non-specialists, probably undergraduates and perhaps even
younger than that. Thus his prose is rich with allusions to pop-culture icons
(Jane Fonda, for instance) and Holl)Twood ITIovies ("Back to the Future" and
"Down and Out in Beverly Hills" figure in chapter titles). He also summarizes very familiar passages from the poetry, such as the boat-stealing episode (159-60), and retells, without adding anything new, well-known
episodes in vVordsworth's life. But somewhere in the process of writing the
book, Blank decided to change direction: "I felt," he explains, "that 1 should,
in the spirit of what is sometimes politely called academic socialization, enter the continuing critical dialogue that speaks to and about Wordsworth"
(9-10). The problem is that the popular audience he originally aiJT\ed for \\'il1
not be interested in the critical debate that shows on nearly every page of
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Wordsworth and Feeling, and the academic audience will find Blank's summaries a waste of time and his pop-culture references a bit vulgar. Stylistically the book is betwixt and between.
A more serious problem is Blank's failure to explain what he means by
feeling and emotion, what Wordsworth might have meant by the words,
whether he would have regarded them as interchangeable terms, as Blank
seems to do, and how emotion is related to rational thought. Blank seems to
assume that these are unproblematic ideas that we all understand and agree
about, disregarding the extensive discussions of them by eighteenth-century
moral philosophers, most of whom Wordsworth was at least familiar with,
and disregarding as well the lively debate about emotion in philosophical
circles today. Now perhaps this, too, is part of Blank's resistance to criticspeak: perhaps he feels that the philosophical distinctions of scholars old and
new would be unnecessarily burdensome for non-specialist readers. But to
this scholar it simply looks like a lack of seriousness and intellectual rigor.
One hopes that Blank returns to the kind of work he did when writing
Wordsworth's Influence on Shelley, a book that considerably advanced our understanding of both poets and contributed in important ways to the critical
debate about literary influence. Wordsworth and Feeling, I fear, will not be so
highly regarded.
Providence College

Bruce Graver

Mane!'s Modernism, or, The Face of Painting in the 1860s by Michael
Fried. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. Pp. 648. $50.00
cloth.
It would be futile to try to provide an "objective" assessment of "Manet's
Sources: Aspects of His Art, 1859-1865," the 1969 work that provides the basis for Michael Fried's book, Manet's Modernism, or, The Face of Painting in the
1860s. The mammoth work (actually Fried's doctoral dissertation at Harvard)
galvanized Manet studies in every sense of the word: it delivered something
like an electric shock to the field when it appeared as a special issue of Artforum. (It is reprinted in its entirety as the first chapter of Manet's Modernism.) With its provocatively questioning thesis (asking what to make of the
"specificity" of Manet's sources), it also spurred art historians into action. As
inevitably as a cottage industry of "source" studies sprang up, so too did
more thoughtful textual readings of the critical reaction to Manet's work.
Many an art historian was literally jolted to life in a formative seminar by
learning to read critically in engaging with Fried's work. (Such, at least, was
my experience in becoming an art historian and a Manet scholar.) But just as
"to galvanize" can also mean "to coat with rust-resistant zinc/, the galvanizing effect of "Manet's Sources" has also in part been an insulating one. The
varieties of art-historical discourse indebted to Fried, as well as the larger
development of the work of Fried himself as exemplified by the present
study, analyze works of art primarily in relation to other works, and to bod-
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ies of writing (principally, but not exclusively, on the visual arts), as if most
questions worth asking can be exclusively derived therein. In that sense, the
word Ifmodernismu for Fried concerns a set of pidorial issues in which the
stakes are the very fate of painting as an art, but in which the game remains
restricted to the domain of art. Fried's project thus differs fundamentally
from the analysis of modernism in relation to modernity one finds in the
work of T. J. Clark, for instance.
Mnnet's Modernism pOSitions itself as a continuation of Fried's studies in
French painting of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Absorption and
Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot (1980) and Courbet's
Realism (1990). Readers of these earlier works will recognize Fried's clear,
forceful, energetic writing, and they will find themselves on familiar analytical ground. As in Fried's earlier books, close readings of critical texts inform
analyses of gestures, poses, and compositions that exemplify pictorial models of figure painting such as absorption, theatricality, and antitheatricality.
Insofar as painting of the French school was of particular importance to Manet, this dimension of Fried's study allows us to think afresh of the relationship of Manet's art to its predecessors as opposed to its successors.
The book's weightiest contribution to Manet studies comes in Chapter
Four, "Manet in His Generation," in which Fried reexamines major canvases
by Manet in light of concerns explored in Chapter Three, "The Generation of
1863." Fried argues that Manet "belonged to a specific artistic generation"
which Fried names after the notorious Salon des Refuses, a group of painters

including Henri Fantin-Latour, Alphonse Legros, and James McNeill Whistler (185). The author identifies aspects of these artists' intense involvement
with the art of the past, as well as particular pictorial interests such as "facingness" and "strikingness" (which Fried sees as illustrative of these painters' antitheatricality). Mane!'s interest in religious paintiJ::tg is highlighted by
Fried's examination of the artistic matrix of such contemporary religious
paintings as Legros' The Ex-Voto and The Vocation of St. Francis. An extensive
meditation on Mane!'s The Angels at the Tomb of Christ side by side with Moreau's Oedipus and the Sphinx, both of which hung in Room "M" of the Salon
of 1864 (both now in New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art) opens onto a
new understanding of the negative critical reaction to Manet's canvases of
that year. Moreau's remarkable painting, with its element of the supernatural, was seen as Baudelairean, and hence capitalized on an audience and on

critical support which might have been Mane!'s (317). Only the kind of careful work Fried undertakes with Salon reviews and with the pictures themselves can produce these kinds of important arguments, and Fried's focus on
Manet among artists such as Legros and Fantin thus bears fruit.
Fried is to be applauded for constructing this new view of Manet in his
generation. It is extraordinarily refreshing to read an account of Manet that
does not consistently taint him with the themes and pictorial concerns of the
Impressionist painters who took certain cues from him, but who broke definitively with the Salon and with the art of the past in ways Manet never did.
Here is a book on Manet that does not unthinkingly repeat that every subject
which ever struck the artist's fancy must have been "modem"; here, too, is a
book which does not catalogue more cafes, streets, prostitutes, vacant lots
and other material on offer in what Fried calls "the low-wattage social
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history of art that was popular during much of the 1970s and 1980s" (178).
Yet if art history in some quarters has tired of the approach that claims to
discover the picture's meaning in the revelation of social and physical material which rnight have been a reference point, I am not sure if art history can
content itself with a view of Ucontext" or of a given artist's "generation"
which is so exclusively pictorial. (Think, for instance, of Sartre's view of Mallarrne's IIgenerationu of poets: their atheism, their narcissism, their new relationship to their public, their consciousness of themselves as "sons.")
Michael Fried's writing has shaped the way many of us think about modernism, and considering the pivotal place of Manet in Fried's own thinking,
it is appropriate that he should give us an expanded view of his writings on
the artist. Clement Greenberg'S formulation that Mane!'s pictures of the
1860s can be seen as the first modernist paintings "by virtue of the frankness
with which they declared the surfaces on which they were painted" necessarily reappears here (409), as it should. Mane!'s art can still support this
view of modernism, as it can Fried's suggestion that the "bullfinch frozen in
flight at the upper center" of Mane!'s Dejeuner sur [,Herbe can be seen as
"emblematizing the notion of a representational act" which was "lightning
fast in its attack" (295). Such an account of painting's self-reflexivity is quintessential Fried, as are so many idiosyncratic readings of pictures throughout
the book. Fried rnight consider Manet's highly politicized Execution of Maximilian to be "the most ambitious project of Mane!'s career" (346), but the author characteristically compares the "point-blank range at which the firing
squad performs its task" to "something like picture-viewing distance" (357;
emphasis original). Thus "a metaphorics of spectatorly aggression against
Mane!'s paintings" emerges, as the artist both withstands hostile criticism
and fires back. If Manet inserted himself metaphorically into the arena near
Queretaro, as Fried suggests-if the Execution is "a field of multiple, labile,
and conflictual identifications and counteridentifications, with Manet himself
-Manet as painter-beholder-at once everywhere and nowhere," then
surely that field involves more than spectatorly aggression, or even "a point
of absolute crisis in the French tradition" with regards to the "conflict between painting and beholder" (358). I take this passage to be emblematic of the
best of Fried's book: it is the kind of proposition which moves us out of
Fried's often ingenious constructs and into the social world around the artist.
To picture Manet as both victim and accomplice at his own execution is to
grasp something about the larger situation of modernist art in the 1860s.
Fried's image reveals the contradictory roles bourgeois society scripts for artists, the best of whom find themselves playing the martyr as well as the
provocateur.
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After the Future: The Paradoxes of PostmodemislIl a11d COlltcmporary Russiall C1I1ture by Mikhail Epstein. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1995.
Pp. xvi + 394. $55.00 cloth; $17.95 paper.
Mikhail Epstein has become a pivotal figure in Russian (formerly Soviet)
criticism since the beginning of the 19805. He was among the very first to
write on the Russian neo-avant-garde in poetry and, a bit later, in prose. This
is how it happened.
In 1985 the major official magazine for literary criticism in the Soviet
Union, Voprosy literatury (Problems of Literature), commissioned articles
from two critics, Epstein and Igor Shaitanov, on recent trends in poctry
known as conceptualism and metametaphorism, both of which had already
been officially condemned. (I was linked closely with the formation of the
latter and was thus under similar pressure.) When these articles were published, they turned out otherwise than the official literati expected. According to Epstein and Shaitanov, we had seen the emergence of a new and
unconstrained poetry as well as the birth of a new criticism. For the first
time since the "Formalist" 1920s and the "scandalous" 1960s of Khrushchev's
thaw, Russian criticism was presented with complicated new material to analyze and from which to build up a new view of culture. Now, for the first
time, this view is available in a collection of essays published in America.
To understand this "alien" view better one has to recognize some peculiarities of Russian approaches to critical writing. For example, Andrei Bitov,
famous writer and canonized martyr to Russian syntax, once described to
me how, when translating a paragraph from John Locke to use as an epigraph for his novel, he had to employ at least twice as many sentences in
Russian to make Locke's ideas clear. Was this because of the syntactical differences between the two languages? Not exactly. From the Russian perspective, Americans, due to perhaps to the "metonymical" nature of English, Me
taught to explain their ideas in order to make them clear to almost everybody, while Russians, progeny of a "metaphorical" language, make their
readeJ;'s discern those ideas on their own in the course of their reading. Russians like to make their ideas sound like a pUll, while Americans prefer to pill
them up with logical development to some not less logical, even if paradoxical, conclusion. Vladimir Nabokov himself, \vho consumed pins as lances in
his lifelong battle against butterflies, could not resist puns when writing in
both Russian and English. Mikhail Epstein, translated into English, docs not
escape this Russian feature either when employing his nati\·e bnguage.
It would not be out of place here to ask whether national mentality i~ dl'tennined by language. My answer is affirmative. Hermann Hesse's Till' GII1.~~
Bead Game, mentioned in passing in Epstein's book, is an example of what
Russians believe any criticism is: a play on words and 1houghts. \Vhik' 1h1..'
Russian Formalists, in the modernist period, were still trying 10 cxplorc the
border between literature and "what is," Russian fnrmalbt:-; in the po.o.;tmodern period, both in Jiteri1turc and in literary criticbm (including Epstein), decided that border means "contlict." Contlict, while rccngnii'l'd (Will
classical antiquity onward as 1he 111(151 powerful tl'chniqul' in arl (or il:-- rebtinn to catharsis, is not the only possible technillllc. Fill" pn:-tl1ltldnni:--m.
\\·hich ~ecks to make pcace between c()ntr(lrie~ (tn ~·(lkl' 1ngl'till'L ,) ... in thl'
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Russian fable, the lion and the doe), conflict as either device or border is obsolete, while the formal idea of a "game," even with "glass beads," is really
what matters. The hero of Hesse's novel, by the way, never thought other\vis€, and neither does Epstein-though he seems to object: "As distinct from
Hesse's conservative and escapist Game, which is essentially derivative and
forbids the creation of new signs and values, transculture aspires entirely to
the sphere of creativity" (299). r use this unobliging quotation to illustrate
the convergence of Epstein's many neologisms in the term transcuiture, by
which he defines and distinguishes his position. What is a "transculture"
and who is a "transculturist"? For Epstein,
Transculture is the mode of existence of one liberated from nature by
culture and culture itself by culturology. The transcultural world has
never been extensively described because the path that leads to itculturology, or the comparative study of cultures-was opened only
recently.
. The transcultural world lies not apart frOID, but within,
all existing cultures, like a multidimensional space that appears gradually over the course of historical time. It is a continuous space in
which unrea1ized, potential elements are no less meaningful than
"rezll" ones.
Through the signs of existing cultures, a "transculturalist" tries to restore the mysterious script of the simultaneously
present and absent transcultural condition. In essence, slhe both discovers and creates this realm. ''''hile scientists, artists, and politicians
make significant but separate contributions to culture in their respective fields, the transculturist elaborates the space of transculture using
various arts, philosophies, and sciences as tools to develop the aU-encompassing genre of cultural creativity. (298-99)
Epstein implies that the critic as "transculturalist" has the same rights as
any author to create an "unreal" equivalent to the "real" of scientists, artists,
and politicians-which, in turn, is the same "unreal" in relation to everyday
reality. In other \Nords, "the critic is an author" who is free to go in any
direction "within all existing cultures" that slhe wants. In the first place,
RussiZln Formalists such as Viktor Shklovsky and Yuri Tynianov already belicved, in the modernist period, in the "equal rights" of critic and author,
and were \vriters as we\l as critics (d. French-American poststructuralism,
wllL're the critic is the only author who may be discussed). Second, any
direction "within all existing cultures" implies directions that are "existing,"
if perhaps not yet revealed (or, as Epstein writes, "unrealized")-that is the
essencc of any "conservative" game, be it chess or glass beads. This direction
wi!! fcn~al, cither through literature or criticism and philosophy, some
"new" rCillity about which we havc only intimation. Here, Epstein goes farther thtln the formalists, who belicved in the "new" in oppostion to "old"
\·aIUl'S (bngu'lgc included) and thus in conflict with them. Unlike the Form,llists, tlnd like the Russian metamelapilorists as well, Epstein knows that
tIll' "nl'\\·" (including langluge) is a matter of combinations. It is what the
g.lllll' is .1blll!L .lllt! Ill) other (on!lict than the tension of the gZlmc exists. Thc
"tr.lIlscultl1r.llist," whn "using \·.1rious tlfts, philosophies, and sciences as
\(l()J:..; III LiL-n'lol" thl' .111-l'IKnmpassing genre of cultural creati\·ity," seellls
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thus emblematic of a postmodernist and postformalist paradox of pluralistic
mastery.
Finally, we come back to where we started: the pun. Epstein's neologism
also originates in pun; it is a "trans-culture" and a "culture of a trance,"
since both terms are spelled the same way in Russian. This is a culture that
is able to foresee, through the contribution of language, its own" afterfuture"
as if being in a trance or in cyberspace. Thus, pan-Russian tradition (if you
excuse the pun) is maintained: Epstein's terms do not just attract thought
but are their very essence. Pun and pin are, in this sense, not just consonances but head and tails of one and the same penny. The play on words at
some point demands that the player set up some rules and start classifying
in the new world. Adam gave names to what was created not by him and already classified by its creator; Lamarck gave names to different plants and
classified them, but they were not created by him either. Borges, on the contrary, created and classified himself, but his classification touches only on his
own creation and leaves no space for alien inventiveness. His type, of course,
is close to that of Epstein's transculturalist, though far from Epstein's own
ambitions.
Epstein's ambitions are very Russian, based as they are on the work of
Dmitri Mendeleev, the inventor of the periodic table of the elements. It was
Mendeleev who put all the known elements in good order, named those already discovered, and, even more important, predicted the existence of
many as yet unrevealed elements by leaving space for them in his table. Epstein follows Mendeleev's path in creating what he calls a "Periodic Table of
the New Russian Literature" (86-87). On this table he places all Russian literature from 1730 to F, which he marks "1990-?" Of course, when he discusses
the literature of earlier periods, Epstein uses terms already accepted (such as
classicism, romanticism, and acmeism), but for the new literature he establishes
some of his own. Thus he defines metametaphorism as composed of two
branches, metarealism and presentalism (the present author, according to Epstein, belongs to the second category). Again, what is pinned down here are
not just terms but also puns: metareaIism, for example, encompasses both
"metare'ality" and "metaphorical realism"; here, metaphor works as compass
to reveal metareality. Moreover, Epstein leaves blank spaces, as did Mendeleev, for directions in literature that are hard to imagine now, even if one is a
transculturalist and a seer.
Epstein's book, in many respects, is an attempt to remain Mendeleev while
becoming Borges; it is both a literary criticism that seeks science and a game
that knows its own earnestness. After the future, both possibilities may
occur.
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The McDonaldization of Society: An Investigation into the Changing Character of
Contemporary Social Life by George Ritzer. Revised edition. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996. Pp xxi + 265. $17.95.

George Ritzer's The McDonaldization of Society is a lucid, and, in many
ways, provocative analysis of the increasing entrenchment and steady institutionalization of the logic and structure of McDonald's in almost all spheres
of vital activities. For Ritzer, McDonald's is not simply in the restaurant
business. Rather than an efficient, cheap, and fast meal, McDonald's offers a
whole modus vivendi. This notorious chain has come to epitomize a scandalous and increasingly insistent phenornenon-McDonaldization; that is, the
ways in which the principles of the fast-food restaurant operate in an increaSingly wide array of social settings (such as the work place, higher education, and health care). Contributing to the acceleration of these structural
changes are several factors, the most important being: the aggressive seeking
of economic interests, the pursuit of McDonaldization as an end in itself
(and, in many ways, as an altaclunent to a traditional life style), and McDonaldization's attunement to certain changes taking place within society (namely, Increased mobility, expanding needs, working parents, and technological
changes).
According to Ritzer, the socioeconomic structures adumbrated by the process of McDonaldization revolve around four interconnected principles: efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control. In a McDonaldizlng society,
the pressure for efficiency-that is, the search for the optimum means for a
given end-is enormous. This pressure calls for increasing calculability-that
is, the emphasis on quantity rather than quality-which in turn leads to a
predictability that is enhanced all the more by the creation of precise, programmable, non-human teclmologies. TIus pursuit of systematization, standardization, consistency, scientific management, and methodological
operation is itself motivated by the desire for greater control over people.
Central to Ritzer's argument is Max Weber's theory of bureaucracy and
the larger process of rationalization that lIDderlies it. While for Weber bureaucracy is the model of rationalization, for Ritzer the fast food restaurant is
the paradigm of McDonaldization. Both instances describe an organizational
model that strives to eliminate inefficiency, irrationaHty, uncertainty, and
unpredictability. It should not overhastily be concluded, however, that the
two processes are the same. McDonaldization is not just an extension of rationalization, it is also an extreme version of it or, as Ritzer himself puts it,
"a quantum leap" (33) in the process of rationalization.
Seen from this vantage point, Ritzer's project is not only an elaborate analysis of the McDonaldization of contemporary society, but also a pointed critique of the excesses of rationalization, in particular, and the legacy of
modernity, in general. While many proclaim the end of modernity, Ritzer
argues for its continuing strong hold. His book takes issue with the common
view that we live in an era that is radically different from the previous one:
"a number of contemporary perspectives, especially postindustrialism, postFordism, and postmodernism contend that we have already moved beyond
the modern world and into a new, starkly different society. 111ese views imply that this book is retrograde because it deals with a 'modern' phenome-
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non that will soon disappear with the emergence of a new societal form. This
book contends, however, that McDonaldization and its 'modern' characteristics not only are here for the foreseeable future, but also are influencing society at an accelerating rate" (148). While other sociologists emphasize a shift
in modem society from uniformity, predictabHity, and standardization to
contingency, uncertainty, and deregulation, Ritzer emphasizes the increasing
domination of a system-that is, McDonaldization-that is built on many of
the ideas that have prevailed in industrial societies, namely bureaucratization, the assembly line, and scientific management.
This hybridity is all the more interesting because it recalls a historical principle that Raymond Williams has aptly articulated in Marxism and Literature
(1977)-namely that society is an uneven formation that is constituted by the
conjunctural overlapping betvveen three trends: "the dominant, residual, and
emergent" (121). For Williams, dominant practices are always in concert, if
not in tension with passive survivals from the past, on the one hand, and inchoate formations and anticipatory developments, on the other hand. Stated
differently, historical developments are not even, demarcations behveen different periods are hardly ever rigid, transitions are not necessarily complete,
and transformations are never vectored. By reiterating this basic premise,
Ritzer provides a nuanced account of the postmodern condition. Although
not necessarily wrong, the widely-held post-industrial thesis is more limited
than many of its adherents tend to believe. Post-industrialization is, in many
ways, coextensive with McDonaldization. The latter is not disappearing; on
the contrary, it is dramatically increasing in importance.
This proposition has Jamesonian overtones. Following' the author of The
Political Unconscious, Ritzer argues that postmodernism does not represent a
break with modernism; rather, it is a continuation-albeit with a difference
-of modernism. While other critics emphasize a break between modernity
and postmodernity (or more pOintedly, between that which is rational and
rigid, on the one hand, and that which is irrational and flexible, on the other
hand), Fredric Jameson argues that postmodernism constitutes the cultural
logic of ~ate capitalism and that it is structurally continuous with older forms
of capitalism. Like Jameson, Ritzer argues that there has been no definite historical break from Fordism. On the contrary, one can point out some commonalities between McDonaldization and Fordism such as rigid
technologies, standardized work routines, and the deskilling of labor. Simply
put, Fordism has not completely vanished; instead, it has evolved into
McDonaldism: "Clearly, while some characteristics of today's 'postmodern'
society differ dramatically from its 'modern' predecessor, great continuity
exists as well. McDonaldization is a highly rational modern phenomenon
yielding, among other things, extremely rigid structures" (159). Ritzer, then
does not deny the intensification of the economy and the complexification of
society in the postmodern era, but emphasizes the continuing relevance of
rational trends, in particular, and the enduring legacy of the spirit of modernity, in general.
The most interesting and most promising aspect of the book is perhaps
Ritzer's analysis of the extent to which the rationality of the system imposed
by McDonaldization spawns irrational tendencies. For example, the replacement of human by nonhuman technology can be unbeneficial. The worker or
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the employee is often forced to learn new technologies, master new
techniques, keep up with upgraded software, figure out new functions, and
memorize new numbers-all of which means that business often has to pay
high prices in order to operate efficiently. In addition, the types of jobs that
ensue from the McDonaldization of society are jobs that require almost no
skill or thinking from the worker. Whether it be a student serving food at
McDonald's or a checker scanning barcodes at a supermarket, there is an increasing dependence upon and subordination to the machine: "Perhaps the
ultimate irrationality of McDonaldization is the possibility that people could
come to lose control over the system-that it could some day come to control
them. Already, these rational systems control many aspects of people's lives"
(143). In the rationalized settings imposed by McDonaldization people behave not as human beings but as functions of the system. A McDonaldized
society is not just a panoptic society it Ia Foucault-that is, a society that is
structured around quasi-utilitarian principles and based on self-policingbut also a dehumanizing society: "though it at least appears that people still
control them, these rational systems can spin beyond the control of even
those who occupy the highest positions within those systems" (143). Because
red tape can render bureaucracies increasingly inefficient and unpredictable,
individuals become both confused and counterproductive. The anger and
frustration generated by the inadequacies of nonhuman technologies can
even lead people to undercut or sabotage the operation of such technologies.
However, Ritzer's analysis of the irrationality that accompanies the rational system he describes is limited, to say the least. Overall, Ritzer rightly
emphasizes the irrationality of rationality, but does not draw the full implications of this proposition. For one thing, The McDonaldization of Society is
constrained by a humanistic perspective that arguably smacks of a nostalgia
for what may be termed, after the French sociologist Alain Touraine, the return of the social actor. Over and over again, Ritzer emphasizes the waning
relevance of agency as one of the main causes leading to the irrationality of
rationality. Even when he moves beyond this analytical frame, he seems to
be content with the assertion that the system that structures contemporary
society is not as efficient, manageable, and predictable as we think it is.
Waiting in long lines at fast food restaurants, being put to work at gas stations and at automated teller machines, or having to learn new technologies
-all these are practices that are indicative of new trends whereby the modern consumer spends an increasingly significant amount of time and energy
doing unpaid labor for a number of organizations and businesses. However,
these are more nuisances than real problems. Occasionally, Ritzer explores
more detrimental problems-such as the impact of McDonaldization on
health and family relationships-but he does so only passingly. His analysis
of the effect of the process he describes on the environment, for instance,
amounts to little more than lip service. It is true, as Ritzer points out, that
the styrofoam packaging used in the fast-food industry does pollute the environment, and that the litter associated with it does create "a public eye
sore across the countryside" (130); but the problems generated by McDonaid's are arguably more deep-seated. In its abuse of resources, its glamorization of over-consumption, and its generation of tremendous waste,
McDonald's epitomizes the very excesses of capitalism in its endless drive
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towards surplus value. With McDonald's we are no longer in use or exchange value, but in "abuse value," to borrow Michel Serres' term.
These shortcomings are all the more disappointing when conSidering the
fact that we are dealing with a revised edition of Ritzer's book (the first edition appeared in 1993). By and large, the revisions Ritzer undertakes in this
volume are far from being a reassessment of the general premise that underlies his argument. The tvvo most significant changes consist in adding a
chapter that discusses the extent to which even birth and death are McDonaldized, and a section that explores the ways in which the Holocaust was
driven by both rationalization and bureaucratization. Interesting as they may
be, these additions hardly change the scope and nature of Ritzer's argument.
Ritzer is very candid about his intentions: "I have, to a large extent, rewritten the text to make the themes and issues even clearer and more accessible.
Thus, I offer a substantial revision, although the basic structure and thrust of
the argument remain the same as those of the first edition" (xiv). Such as it
is, the new edition of The McDonaldization of Society is more a refinement
than a revision in the full import of the term.
The most insistent problem the reader encounters in The McDonaldization of
Society pertains to the theoretical implications of Ritzer's neo-Weberian
perspective. Ultimately, McDonaldization strikes the reader as a totalizing
concept that is informed by a deterministic logic. Part of the problem is that
Ritzer is insufficiently critical of Weber's characterization of modernity as the
"iron cage" of rationality. Broadly speaking, the iron cage is a neologism for
a system that alienates, controls, and imprisons its participants. In Weber's
original formulations, bureaucracies are institutions or cages in which people
are trapped and their basic humanity is denied, which is tantamount to saying that society is caught up in a seamless web of rati.onalized structures
with little or no way out. Weber's emphasis on "reason" in his prognosis of
modern or rational capitalism is particularly emphasized in Ritzer's project:
"Just as Weber fettered over the emerging iron cage of rationality, I foresee a
similar iron cage being created by the increasing ubiquity of the fast-food
model'" (33). To put it somewhat differently, Ritzer proclaims that McDonaldization has no bounds; opposition may momentarily delay this process,
but not hinder its negative effects or reverse its course.
Of course, not everybody shares this pessimistic vision. Ritzer himself concedes that people do not react uniformly to their McDonaldized environment. Some people like the predictability of many aspects of their lives. For
this group, McDonaldization is "a velvet cage" (177) that poses no threat
whatsoever but, instead, promises nirvana. Others do acknowledge that contemporary life is predictable, impersonal, and dehumanizing, but believe
that the spell of the system that produces these trends is not without possible escapes; that one can, in fact, be momentarily de-McDonaldized. For
these people, McDonaldization is a "rubber cage the bars of which can be
stretched to allow adequate means for escape" (177). Ritzer, however, shares
neither the optimist attitude of the former group, nor the sober claims of the
latter group. In his view, the McDonaldized cage is made of iron, pure and
simple: lithe most extreme sense of the iron cage of McDonaldization, is this:
it can become an inhuman system that controls everyone, leaders included.
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With no people to appeal to, oppose, or overthrow in their efforts to escape,
people may become even more hopelessly imprisoned" (143).
The problems that transpire in Ritzer' 5 sOciological perspective are worthy
of attention partly because they transcend the issue at hand. They are endemic of methodological difficulties common in a variety of fields ranging
from cultural studies to historical analyses. Skeptical of the legacy-and
even cynicism-of poststructuralism, particularly in its emphasis on the aleatory, the stochastic, and the different, Inany historians and critics have
pointed out the need to recognize an irreducible system or a basic structure.
If everything were a matter of difference and diffraction, then nothing can be
held with certainty to be systematic. To ignore this fundamental premise is
to fall prey to what may be termed a spectral analysis which accentuates difference but falls short of effectively synthesizing the ensuing discontinuities
within the precincts of a projected totality. Pursuing heterogeneity beyond
any conceivable totality, as Steven Best has rightly pointed out in his contribution to Postmodernism/Jomeson/Critique (1989), "mystifies the fact that in
capitalist society, there are not just differences and antinomies, but also
strong tendencies towards reWed sameness, conformity, and generality"
(362). Weary of the shortcomings of poststructuralism, Ritzer does provide a
systematic analysis of postmodern society, but the system he envisages is, in
many ways, totalitarian. What needs to be addressed is the possibility of
holding in tension the total and the fragmentary without necessarily being
inconsistent.
Even in a project as far-reaching as that of the Frankfurt School-and more
specifically in Adorno and Horkheimer's neo-Weberian critique of the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1982)-this question is not satisfactorily resolved. \Alhat Adorno and Horkheimer saw in modern industrial
society is a "totality" characterized above all by its ability to control individual consciousness, manipulate needs, promote obedience, and induce submission: "The might of industrial society is lodged in men's minds.
. The
industry as a whole has molded men as a type unfailingly reproduced in
every product ... what is decisive today is the necessity inherent in the system not to leave the customer alone, not for a moment to allow him any suspicion that resistance is possible" (127-41). Seen from this perspective, the
culture industry is a seamless web in which all forms of resistance and all
possibilities of change-being programmed by the system itself-are ultimately reified. In Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, as in
Ritzer's The McDonaldization of Society, capitalism is presented as a space
from which nothing can free itself. To talk about the culture industry or the
culture of McDonaldization is to talk about the hegemony of capitalism tout
court. If McDonaldization eases its spell, we are told, it is only in response to
consumer dissatisfaction and in return for a more thoroughly engulfing system. The inefficiency that ensues from McDonaldization does not constitute
a threat but a strategy that ensures the continuity of the system: "\Alhen people have pressured McDonaldized systems, these systems have responded
by mitigating their excesses" (179). What this proposition means, in part, is
that McDonaldization is an inalienable process and, more importantly for
our purpose, that it is a closed system.
In order to rid the concept of the system of its totalitarian bent, one has to
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recognize that an inexorable part of the system's logic is its tendency to develop contradictory tendencies which suggest the existence of limits to the
capacity of society to be over-organized. The emphasis on the openness of
the system makes it possible to propose a more viable understanding of capitalism, namely that capitalism has not only a tendency to envelop the entirety of the social body, but also a proclivity to develop dysfunctionalities,
create deficiencies, provoke deviations, and generate counter-processes that
are more tendentious than Ritzer is willing to admit. What the author of Thc
McDol1oldizatioll of Sacicty fails to observe is that the deployment of the system produces unpredictable conditions which call for a special attention not
only to the reproduction of the system, but also the movement of its elements. Systems theory teaches us tha t the continuity of the system does not
reside in its identity but in the relation of its elements to their environment.
Capitalism is an inherently unstable system which engenders a continuous
interplay of its elements; this play of elements, however, is not without consequences-in attenuating its internal contradictions and replacing its elements, the system transforms itself. The system feeds, as it were, on its own
problems, but in the process it evolves and changes. To fail to acknowledge
this basic premise is to characterize postmodernity as yet another iron cage.
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